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Chance and Regularities
Remarks on Richard Rorty’s Contingentism
Rosa M. Calcaterra
1 When accounting for human events, biographical paths, the life of nature in which we are
immersed, and even cosmic reality, common sense and ordinary communicative practices
deploy regularity and chance as either opposing terms or, alternatively, as an inseparable
conceptual couple. These two possibilities, which often feature in the same discursive
context, sometimes in alternation, or even coexist rather than exclude themselves from
each other, eventually reveal our deep unease with handling unequivocal,  neutral,  or
“objective”  categories  –  like  those  of  regularity  and  chance  –  which  animate  the
development of our culture from within. An intricate web of logical and semantic criteria,
in addition to psychological and anthropological implications, holds together these two
concepts according to very complex interactions. However, for purposes of simplification,
their different treatment in our philosophical  tradition can be seen in two canonical
fronts: chance, or, in more current terms, contingency, and necessity or determinism.
2 It  is  easy to observe that the first theoretical  aspect is  one of the most consolidated
approaches in postmodernism. I would like to briefly show how the metaphysical quality
of  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  regularity  and  chance  flows  into  the
construction of postmodern discourse,  although in a very different way,  and,  indeed,
under the auspices of the anti-metaphysics that such a discourse claims. I borrow the
term  “tychism,”  which  names  Peirce’s  cosmological-metaphysical  theory  of  chance,
because I think it lends itself to a translation on the level of postmodern philosophy, in
particular to a positive reading of the connection between history and chance that stands
out  in  the  work of  Richard Rorty,  the  ‘post-modern’  neo-pragmatist  philosopher  par
excellence. Despite Rorty’s decision to write off the philosophy of Peirce from his list of
sources of inspiration, I believe that the tychism that appears in the latter as an integral
part of the ontological framework of a semiotic epistemology centered on fallibilism and
the so-called “logical socialism” offers ideas that must be re-evaluated in relation to the
ethical stance that goes with Rorty’s anti-foundationalism. 
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3 As mentioned above, contingentism has received widespread support within postmodern
culture. More precisely, a good part of the various criticisms of modernity provided in
contemporary culture converge in the tendency to nourish a serious suspicion regarding
any attempt to trace back human phenomena to a deterministic framework, that is a
metaphysical perspective according to which all  realities imply an intrinsic teleology.
Such a framework à la Wolff would in principle rule out chance as an effective component
working in each order of  reality,  or  reduce it  to  a  mere accident  of  pre-determined
substance of being. On the other hand, the biology of the twentieth century provided an
ever wider currency to the idea that chance intervenes at various levels of life in nature
or,  rather,  that  it  is a  determining factor  of  every novelty  in  the biosphere.  In  this
respect,  the  biological  studies  of  Jacques  Monod  are  paradigmatic.  However,  it  is
important to notice his assertion that the emergence of ethical and moral issues and,
more generally,  ideas of value within the evolution of reality,  mark the “frontières de
l’inconnu” (Monod 1970: 156). 
4 As a matter of fact, the fascinating theme of the relationship between the chance and the
regularity of phenomena of both the physical-material and the historical-social world
runs  through,  in  a  more  or  less  declared way,  scientific  and philosophical  research.
Furthermore, it would be incongruous and misleading to downplay the psychological and
existential implications that such a problem entails. In fact, the idea of chance acts mostly
as a disturbing challenge to our need for security that certainly the idea of regularity
succeeds  somehow  to  fulfill.  But  the  reverse  question  is  also  worth  inquiring:  to
emphasize regularity, in an extreme analysis, leads to closing the space of freedom and of
human  responsibility,  while  the  notion  of  chance  offers,  at  least  in  principle,  the
possibility that the events that mostly concern humans do not form a mechanical chain
so strong that can never be broken – or, alternatively, chance can be thought of as one of
the names we give to what seems imponderable to us in the present moment. 
5 This  ambiguity,  which  could  be  defined  at  first  as  a  psychological  and  existential
ambiguity, is reflected at the logical and semantic level and, in any case, has extremely
concrete roots. In fact, regularity presents itself in an objectively observable way, so as to
be/become the very raison  d’être of  our  scientific  and philosophical  efforts  to  obtain
explicative and, at the same time, predictive, theories of the development of physical-
material and cultural facts. The regularities of the relations between phenomena “appeal
to our intelligence as its cousins,” wrote Peirce (CP 6.64), while the concept of chance is
itself  “unintelligible”  (CP  6.52),  that  is  it  does  not  explain  anything.  Yet,  it  bursts
powerfully onto the stage of scientific research whenever one realizes that the analysis of
“facts” not only fails to produce any explanation of the irregularities that are revealed
during their investigations, but also fails to declare, on the simple basis of their logical
and empirical  means,  the causes  to assign the onset  of  regularities  that  support  the
observed phenomena (Peirce 1923: 201).
6 It is important to note that Peirce associates the category of chance with the notion of the
“spontaneity  of  nature”  and,  in  parallel,  with  the  category  of  law/regularity.  His
suggestion  is  to  consider  the  hypothesis  that  chance/spontaneity  constitutes  a
component of  the life  of  the Universe that  is  not  in opposition to the idea that  the
universe is governed by the principle of necessity or objective legality. The metaphysical
conjecture of chance could rather offer an answer to the difficulties about determinism
raised by evolutionary theories. Therefore, Peirce holds that chance/spontaneity implies
a certain degree of regularity, which in fact gets manifested in the evolutionary continuity,
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that  is  to  say,  in  the  increasing  complexity  of  reality,  which  is  marked  by  the
diversification of nature. The latter is considered as an intrinsic moment in the becoming
of nature, and not as its original cause: the principle of chance cannot be invoked to
explain either natural facts or their variations.
7 Peirce was well aware that the establishment of the intertwining of chance/spontaneity
and regularity/legality of nature was not sufficient to respond to questions concerning
the  relations  between  “psychic”  and  “physical”  facts.  To  be  sure,  these  questions
ultimately  imply  the  possibility  of  explaining  the  position  of  human  beings  in  the
evolutionary  reality  of  the  universe  and,  in  the  end,  of  giving  an  account  of  the
relationship  between  nature  and  culture.  Peirce’s  synechism, his  theory  of  logical-
ontological continuum, aimed at providing the epistemological tools to address precisely
these questions. However the deep union of liberty/spontaneity and necessity/law is, for
Peirce, only a working hypothesis, and actually represents an “open question” – as he
says in “The Architecture of Theories.” In this article, he tries to sustain that regularity
makes action by chance/spontaneity effective, since it constitutes the moment in which
the causal event turns into a new “fact” that fits into the preexisting natural context.
Apart  from  the  difficulty  that  Peirce’s  cosmology  certainly  involves,  what  appears
particularly interesting is the connection between chance/spontaneity and regularity/
law that forms the evolutionary continuum, which in fact excludes an absolute original
causal principle. After all, this connection corresponds, for Peirce, to the hypothesis that
accounts  for  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  his  thought,  namely  fallibilism. To  such  an
insurmountable normative criterion of his philosophy Peirce entrusts the authentic spirit
of  scientific  research,  and  more  specifically  both  its  epistemic  and  ethical  peculiar
quality. “The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified” (CP 1.171) he
declares, and in his prospect of his planned The Principles of Philosophy, he specifies: “The
great  opponent  of  this  philosophy has  been in  history,  and is  in  logic,  infallibilism,
whether in its milder ecclesiastical form, or in its more dire scientistic and materialistic
apparitions” (CP 8, 284, c.1893).
8 The scientific-philosophical problem of the relationship between regularity and chance
inevitably, although subliminally, verges on the metaphysical level of analysis. Therefore
it is opportune to reflect on the use of such concepts in order to improve our awareness
of  the  logical  and  semantic  depth  of  the  words  that  weave  our  discourse.  From  a
theoretical  point of view, the most critical  issue is asking if  and to what extent it  is
legitimate to treat the notions of regularity and chance in terms of absolute original
principles  of  phenomenical  reality.  A positive answer would mean accepting to treat
these notions according to the traditional foundationalism’s necessity to indicate a self-
sufficient  ontological  and  gnoseological  primum,  which  could  serve  as  a  sort  of
Archimedean point on which to base all our knowledge and value statements. As noted
above, Peirce’s tychism can be read as a step toward overcoming such a perspective. In
any  event,  the  postmodern  culture,  together  with  kindred  pragmatism-inspired
philosophies,  surely  promotes  the  rejection  of  the  idea  of  the  absolute  primum,
committing  rather  to  the  elaboration  of  philosophical  alternatives  to  the  traditional
foundationalist stance  through which  the  very  idea  of  “foundation”  is  re-structured
according to a pragmatic meaning. In a few words, this means to bypass traditional both
empiricist  and  rationalist  foundationalism  focusing,  rather,  on  the  continuous
interference of conceptual and empirical factors in all forms of human intelligence and,
therefore, on individual and social action as a criterion of fundamental importance and
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yet  disengaged from any absoluteness.  Thus  agency is  conceived as  the  result  of  an
interpretation  of  the  plot  between  the  logical-semantic  elements  and  the  empirical
elements that compose the development of the human world. To put it differently, action
is a “fact” (pragma) relative to an interpretative context that, in principle, bids fallibility
instead  of  indisputability,  and  the  possibility  of  adjustment  and  even  of  substantial
transformation instead of definitive certainty.1 
9 According to this view, one can see a fruitful ethical harmony between Rorty’s steadfast
battle against foundationalist epistemologies,2 on the one hand, and the centrality of the
theme of cultural differences in postmodern thinking as oriented towards contingency,
on the other hand. As is known, the affirmation of the necessity to not simply recognize
differences but above all respect them and treat them as sustenance for the construction
of individual and social life has involved, in a broad way, various areas of artistic and
philosophical  production,  and  has  been  realized  through  more  or  less  radical
deconstructions of a large portion of the vocabulary of modernity. Both on the theoretical
and ethical-political levels, all this has seriously undermined modern thinkers’ attitude to
construct abstract philosophical  models.  In particular,  one can notice attacks on two
closely  interconnected demands  in  modern philosophical  thought:  the  a-temporal  or
essentialist images of so-called human nature and the subsequent effort to reduce the
disparity  of  intellectual  and  social  practices  through  the  formulation  of  abstract
principles or purposes of rationality. The continuous remarks of Rorty on both matters3
fruitfully intersect with the harsh criticisms that Jean-François Lyotard – an emblematic
representative of postmodern thought – pushed forward in confronting the incapacity of
philosophical thought to recognize the fluidity of knowledge and practice. In a nutshell,
Lyotard  challenged  modern  philosophers  for  being  unable  to  acknowledge  the  ever
flowing equilibrium that human inventiveness can set into motion to respond to the
problems and expectations that gradually emerge in each historical and social contexts.4
It is precisely because of such a philosophical myopia that, according to Lyotard, the crisis
of the “métarécits” offered by the great thinkers of modernity has occurred and reached a
point  of  no  return.  According  to  his  analysis,  all  systematic  modern  philosophies
produced  these  meta-narratives just  to  try  for  a  unitary  –  basically  teleological  and
necessary – justification of the developing processes of the western world. 
10 Lyotard’s expression métarécits is established as one of the most influential metaphors
within  contemporary  debate  regarding  the  notions  of  human nature  and  rationality
based on the epistemological criteria shaping up the plot of philosophical systems of
modernity. It would be interesting to see exactly to what extent the main lines of thought
of  this  leading  figure  of  the  ‘philosophie  de  la  différence’ closely  dovetails  with  the
formulation,  “One world,  but  one world in paribus,” in which the sociologist  Horace
M. Kallen synthesizes the principle of ‘cultural pluralism.’ However, I limit myself to note
the pervasiveness of the latter expression in the current language of western society,
where in fact its recurrence is now consolidated in the most oddly assorted theoretical or
media contexts. In any event, from a broader point of view, one can glimpse a significant
agreement between the philosophies of Rorty and Lyotard regarding Kallen’s clarification
that the expression ‘cultural pluralism’ designates a precise socio-political orientation
according to which one hopes for a human world enriched by the contributions of its
local diversities. But it is evident that such a socio-political orientation entails specific
theoretical and ethical orientations. 
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11 There  is  an  evident  asymmetry  between  the  convincing  discourses  provided  for
supporting the principle of cultural pluralism and the concrete dynamics of the socio-
ethical reality of our time. Nevertheless, one must consider if such a discrepancy may
justify bracketing or even eliminating postmodern critiques on the traditional search of
all-encompassing epistemic and practical criteria. These critiques, in fact, intertwine with
an appeal to adopt a pluralist perspective focused on the respect for, and the appreciation
of, both synchronic and diachronic differences that mark the human world. One can try
to understand this aspect of the controversies about modernity in the light of the Kantian
notion  of  “regulative  ideal,”  which  hinges  precisely  upon  the  recognition  of  the
normative potential yet to be fully realized in our ideas of truth and value. It is an aspect
of Kant’s thought that, in my view, condenses his discovery of the solid practical function
of human attitude to ideality. Although it may seem paradoxical, since he is a prominent
protagonist of modernity, one can see that Kant’s concept of “regulative ideal” tacitly
plays an important role also in the pragmatist postmodernism of Rorty. First of all, this
concept  seems  implied  in  the  emphasis  that  he  laid  upon the  ‘prophetic’  quality  of
philosophical discourse and, more generally, in the most characteristic features of his
historical anti-foundationalism. 
12 Before  addressing  more  closely  these  elements  in  the  work  of  Rorty,  one  should
acknowledge  that  postmodernism  and  neo-pragmatism  certainly  present  noteworthy
‘family resemblances,’ in the sense of Wittgenstein’s famous expression. Nonetheless, and
following precisely Wittgenstein’s suggestion, to draw up a list of their affinities would be
a very complex and,  also,  rather risky endeavor.5 This is  due to the simple fact that
neither  of  these  two terms –  postmodernism and neo-pragmatism –  can designate  a
compact and unequivocal cultural movement. Like all labels, ‘post-modernism’ and ‘neo-
pragmatism’ serve to gather under a single tag a complex variety of starting points, styles
and perspectives that are both theoretical and socio-political.6 However, apart from their
internal diversity, both classical and contemporary pragmatist philosophers share with
postmodernism a particular attention to the value of human practices, historicity, and
dynamism of epistemic and value criteria. In short, there is a fully shared commitment to
show the interpretive and constructing mark of human intelligence or, as William James
said, to show that “the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything” (James 1975:
37). 
13 Richard  Rorty  gave  voice  to  this  philosophical  attitude  with  particular  vigor.  It  is
fundamental  to  consider  that  he  intentionally  adopted  a  provocative  style  to  bring
forward his project to form a cultural climate in which one would be able to renounce a
number  of  theoretical  and  methodological  criteria  deeply  rooted  in  the  western
philosophical tradition. It would be a cultural climate in which, first of all, one would be
able to reject the essentialist mindset, which marks the origins and developments of our
history of ideas. It is precisely at this level that Rorty’s ‘post-philosophy’ amounts to a
serious attack against any kind of dogmatism, whether epistemic, value-related, or socio-
political:  an  attack  launched  along  with  an  insistent  call  to  recognize  the  radical
contingency of our ways to know, evaluate, and even plan our future, but such a call holds
a deep ethical tonality. 
14 The combination of contingency/chance and ethical intention certainly poses problems.
Any ethical proposal involves the idea of some norms to be implemented, which, in turn,
implies the issue of individual or social approval, that is, the idea of the responsibility of
the agents to implement or not a certain normative settings.  But then,  how can one
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conciliate all of this with Rorty’s emphasis on the radically contingent nature of all our
cognitive and behavioral criteria, an emphasis that risks to dissolve irreparably the very
notions  of  normativity  and  responsibility?  Yet,  one  might  say  that  the  typically
postmodern  challenge  of  constructing  a  pluralistic  mentality  against  any  form  of
authoritarianism – a challenge which is particularly evident in Rorty’s philosophy – just
takes advantage of the tension between contingency and ethics, instead of simply outlive
it. In this regard, it is particularly interesting to consider the semantic and conceptual
coupling between contingency/chance and history, which bakes up Rorty’s assertion that
there are no ethical certainties or epistemic truths guaranteed once and for all as well as
his proposal of an ethical commitment that would concern each and every one of us. 
15 One can easily observe,  in fact,  that chance is most invoked simultaneously with the
statement of historicity of all human events and phenomena. Nevertheless, in various
argumentative contexts, one notes a subtle yet constant shift between the meaning of
chance as a merely fortuitous causal power of historical evolutions and as an opportunity or
a potentiality that is offered to human initiative, although always under the sign of its
radical finiteness and fallibility. Some vital aspects of Rorty’s philosophy fall  into the
latter category, aspects that would otherwise remain completely meaningless or even
trivial enough to border on mere rhetorical fiction. It is precisely in this light that ethical
normativity can be recovered within Rorty’s contingentism. I am thinking in particular to
irony as a pivotal aspect of his ethical-political prospective, which elsewhere I define as
“aesthetic meliorism”7 and, more specifically, to his assertion that “there is such a thing
as moral progress, and that this progress is indeed in the direction of greater human
solidarity” (Rorty 1989: 192). 
16 To be sure,  this assertion might seem at first glance quite discordant with the many
phenomena  of  lack  of  solidarity  that  each  of  us  can  list  from  our  own  personal
experiences as well as those from the international socio-political situation. Nevertheless,
it would be inappropriate to get rid sic et simpliciter of Rorty’s assertion that the value of
solidarity  has  gradually  strengthened enough to have a  major  or  central  role  in the
positive evolution of the moral field. One can observe, in fact, that there has been an
always-growing number of initiatives based on the criterion of solidarity, which acquired
various forms of institutionalization. Apart from some undeniable critical points of the
neo-pragmatist contingentism of Rorty, it is worth to notice of the crucial connection of
communicating, feeling, and doing that such a philosophical viewpoint recommends as an
alternative to traditional philosophical accounts of human solidarity.
17 To briefly illustrate this suggestion, one must recall the heuristic function that the theme
of hope unfolds in the cultural project of Rorty. Placing himself on the same wavelength as
the  founding fathers  of  American democracy  as  well  as  Ralph Waldo Emerson,  Walt
Whitman, and John Dewey, Rorty’s philosophical discourse seeks to support “the ability
to believe that the future will be unspecifiably different from, and unspecifiably freer
than, the past” (Rorty 1999: 120) that, according to him, characterizes the original spirit
of  American  democratic  culture.  Thus  he  may  be  included  among  the  ‘classical’
representatives of meliorism that characterizes the American cultural tradition, of which
he certainly tends to increase the ‘aesthetic’  dimension, that is to say,  those lines of
thought that privilege the function of sentiments with respect to other dimensions of the
human  being.  Such  a  meliorist-aesthetic  orientation  is  precisely  specified  in  Rorty’s
appeal to revive hope in a continuous increase in sentiments of human solidarity and of
their unique ability to face oppression and cruelty, relying not on rationalist stances but
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rather on the power of imagination and on literary narratives. Such a hope rests on the
abandonment of the rhetoric of objectivity to try to bring forward instead the possibility
of realizing in acceptable terms the search for individual autonomy from transcendent
forces and principles, or better, the search for self-reliance, which modernity itself had
presented as  in apparent  contrast  with its  foundational  demands of  epistemic extra-
temporal principles and morals. To make a very general note, think of the theories of
sovereignty  of  the  self  that,  starting  with  Descartes,  extend  throughout  the  whole
modern era, finding an exemplary stage in the Kantian theory of the dynamic connection
between autonomy of reason, liberty, and moral obligation.8 
18 Although  all  this  paved  the  way  for  the  process  of  disengagement  of  the  value  of
solidarity from theological vocabulary and essentialist  theories of the human subject,
thus favoring the processes of democratization, according to Rorty the crucial point in
modern thought lies in its having obfuscated the importance of the empirical approach to
the sphere of moral values. On the contrary, his contingentism forces philosophical
attention to the empirical components of ethical and moral criteria, suggesting tacitly
that it is only from this point of view that one can speak of moral obligation without
succumbing to mere precepts, whether of the philosophical or theological type. Indeed,
on this issue Rorty’s position serves to radicalize the classical scheme for which there can
be no moral responsibility if there is no freedom to choose. That is,  as Rorty himself
affirms,  “Moral  obligation  is,  in  this  view,  to  be  thrown  in  with  a  lot  of  other
considerations, rather than automatically trump them” (Rorty 1989: 194). Furthermore,
speaking of ethical and moral empirical criteria is in line with the primary commitment
of  his  philosophical  project:  namely,  that  of  rejecting  any  non-  or  extra-discursive
constrains on our inquiry, whether scientific or ethical-political, that is the commitment
to argumentation and justification proposed in the course of inquiry alone.9 However,
this amounts precisely to the assertion of a normative criterion to implement or, better,
an ideal to render regular.
19 Let us return to the declaration that “there is such a thing as moral progress,” for which
it  is  necessary  to  recall  a  decisive  component  of  Rorty’s  thought:  human  history  is
linguistic  history,  that  is  to  say,  it  amounts  to  the  evolution  of  “vocabularies”
corresponding to the various forms of life gradually articulated in and by them. Above all,
it is a history marked by influential metaphors in which instances of change in human
life,  as well  as re-descriptions of the very natural  and social  reality in which we are
immersed, reverberate. In sharp disagreement with the universalist repertoire of modern
philosophy, Rorty underscores the linguistic nature of every human activity, or better,
the symbolically mediated feature of the very logical-cognitive parameters that, govern
our living practices just as our personal and cultural identity. In this framework, drawn
on the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Davidson, Rorty supports a notion of the self as
centered  on  contingency  rather  than  on  essentialism,  contributing  therefore  to  a
narrative model of personal identity, according to which it consists of a process of self-
description where each of us puts in place a request of recognition by others. This is a
process that establishes a strong connection between language, social interaction, and self-
awareness, posing the creation and acquisition of new metaphors, and in the end, of new
vocabularies and ways of speaking, like the strengths of ethical development of society. 
20 As a consequence, Rorty invites us to pursue what he retains should be an important
factor of  contemporary feminism,  that  is,  the “ability to eschew such Enlightenment
fantasies of escape,” without, however, succumbing to the seductions of relativistic or
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irrational  rhetoric  of  postmodernism  or  to  the  dynamic  of  effective  powers.  More
precisely, the invitation is to avoid “the embarrassments of the universalist claim that the
term  human  being  –  or  even  the  term  woman  –  names  an  unchanging  essence,  an
ahistorical  natural  kind with a  permanent  set  of  intrinsic  factors,”  therefore leaving
behind “questions about the accuracy of their representations of ‘woman’s experience’.”
Alternatively, women would themselves be “creating such an experience by creating a
language, a tradition, and an identity” (Rorty 1992: 15).
21 This approach to the issues of feminism is a specific application of what might be defined
as Rorty’s ‘linguistic historicism.’ The latter includes among its central notions that one
of “semantic authority,” according to which one can acquire a moral and social identity
only when one is able to regain the space of one’s “public word” and, above all, to the
extent  that  one’s  discourse  is  starting  to  have  success,  that  is  it  is  recognized  and
attended  by  other  people.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  prepare  the  means,  not  yet
currently  available,  that  would  help  individuals  and  social  groups  suffering  from
marginalization and injustice to define themselves, their own purposes and needs. It is
precisely  here  where  one  finds  the  gap  between  pragmatism  and  the  universalist
paradigm that  __  according  to  Rorty  __  is  equivalent  to  both  ethical  and  epistemic
realism, which, in turn, often coincides with necessitarianism. Alternatively, this requires
the recovery of the aesthetic dimension in which, as mentioned above, Rorty couches the
key notion of his philosophical proposal: the sentiment of solidarity. 
22 It  is  strange that among those authors particularly sensitive to the aesthetic level  of
culture, and therefore to its importance for philosophical reflection, some are indeed
very  critical  of  Rorty’s  thought.  A  significant  example  seems  to  be  that  of  Thomas
Alexander, who holds that human beings strive to live concrete experiences of meaning
and value, especially those embodied in the world. In brief, according to his theory, being
a primary biological  necessity,  the need for meaning and value is  so radical  that  its
exclusion inevitably brings either death or destructive fury, being.10 Alexander does not
hesitate to define this as Eros, a term that, in his language, indicates a “desire or need”
rather than an exercise in human will: “We need to feel that our own lives are meaningful
and have value” (Alexander 2013: 6). Therefore, he poses an intimate link between the
fields of biology, aesthetics, meaning, and value, and it is precisely on this intersection
that the important recovery of the philosophy of John Dewey on the part of Alexander
insists.  In  the  end,  he  attributes  to  Dewey the merit  of  having constructed on solid
philosophical bases an “ethics of meaning,” while Rorty would have turned pragmatism
in an extreme form of irrationalism and moral relativism.11 In truth, Rorty repeatedly
rejected this charge, and one can instead say that he has re-proposed, with new and more
refined philosophical tools,  the great challenge launched by the classical pragmatists,
especially by James and Dewey: to translate the pathos of contingency into an ethos that is
able to combine the dismissal of absolutes with the responsibility to construct meanings
and values, accepting the argumentative interpersonal and intercultural practices as the
regularity of our moral history. 
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NOTES
1. For a more detailed discussion of these aspects, see Calcaterra 2003. 
2. The most decisive arguments in this regard can be found in Rorty 1979. 
3. For the anti-essentialist theory of human nature, see in particular Rorty (1989: 35-56).
4. The continuities and discrepancies between Rorty and Lyotard are documented in Rorty 1984.
5. An attempt of this type is in Malachowski (2010: 6-16). 
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6. Regarding neo-pragmatism, one can even note a consistent tendency to distinguish it from
‘new pragmatism,’ meaning, in the case of the latter term, a movement toward the revision of
Rorty’s  thought.  After  all,  ever  since its  birth,  pragmatism has been marked by a  variety  of
aspects  and  directions,  a  variety  that  nevertheless  represents  different  ways  of  declining  a
common project, rather than true and real speculative contrasts. I  have argued this thesis in
various contexts, among which I recall Calcaterra 2003, and Calcaterra 2008. 
7. See Calcaterra 2014. 
8. An interesting clarification of the centrality of the issue of subjective autonomy in modern
thought can be found in Pippin 1991. 
9. See Rorty 1982. 
10. See Alexander (2013: 6). In support of the thesis of the biological nature of the need for
meaning and value, the author invokes the famous work of the psychiatrist Viktor Frankl (see,
Frankl 1948), which shows the experience of prisoners in Nazi concentration camps who that the
search for meaning constitutes a “primary motivational force” of human life and not an already
“secondary rationalization” of instinctual drives. 
11. See Alexander (2013: 142-58).
ABSTRACTS
The relationship between regularity  and chance,  or  necessity  and contingency,  is  a  common
concern  of  classical  pragmatists.  The  metaphysical  quality  of  this  issue  flows  into  the
construction  of  postmodern  discourse,  although  in  a  very  different  framework  and,
paradoxically,  under  the auspices  of  the anti-metaphysics  that  such a  discourse  claims.  This
paper  proposes  at  first  a  brief  reconstruction  of  the  chance  and  regularity  issue  in
postmodernism; then Peirce’s cosmological-metaphysical theory of chance, namely his ‘tychism,’
is recalled as a fruitful suggestion to avoid the conceptual split between chance and regularity.
Subsequently,  considering the family resemblances between postmodernism and Rorty’s  neo-
pragmatism, the insistence upon history and contingency that stands out in his work will be
tackled as a ‘postmodern tychism’ that, in fact, does not fit too-easy readings according to which
he would  have  turned pragmatism into  an  extreme form of  irrationalism and radical  moral
relativism. In particular, this paper aims to enlighten Rorty’s effort to re-propose, with new and
more refined philosophical tools, the great challenge posed by the classical pragmatists: namely,
the  challenge  to  translate  the  pathos  of  contingency  into  an  anti-dogmatic  ethos,  that  is  a
cultural stance that might be able to combine the rejection of absolutes with the commitment to
construct meanings and values hosting argumentative interpersonal and intercultural practices
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